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Development and Application of Business 
Valuation Methods by the Delaware Courts 
 




Appraisal is a right and a remedy. Available by statute in all 
states, appraisal provides dissenting shareholders the right to require 
the corporation to pay them the ‘fair value’ of their shares upon some 
mergers or other fundamental changes. Appraisal statutes provide 
procedures for dissenting shareholders to receive a judicial hearing 
in which the court appraises the value of their interests. A primary 
purpose of appraisal statues is to protect minority shareholders. The 
intent of appraisal valuations by courts is to compensate dissenting 
minority shareholders equitably for the unwanted change in their 
investments. 
Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(‘DGCL’) entitles dissenting stockholders to refuse cash, stock or 
other consideration provided by a merger agreement and allows 
them to demand payment in cash of the fair value of their shares.  
A dissenting stockholder may enforce the right by commencing an 
appraisal proceeding in the Delaware Court of Chancery against 
the corporation surviving the merger.  A decision by the Court of 
Chancery in an appraisal proceeding may be appealed to the 
Delaware Supreme Court. 
Section 262 contains exceptions and procedural requirements, 
which must be met.  However, the purpose of this article is to 
discuss the important role of the Delaware courts in the 
development and application of business valuation methods. 
Thus, exceptions and procedural issues will be discussed only as 
necessary to understand the court decisions on business valuation 
methods. 
 
* Edmund H. Mantell is Professor of Finance at the Lubin Graduate School of Business, Pace 
University, New York, and N.Y. 
** Edward Shea is Adjunct Professor of Finance at the Lubin Graduate School of Business, Pace 
University, New York, and N.Y. and Counsel to Windels, Marx, Lane & Mittendorf, LLP. 
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Numerous appraisal proceedings are commenced in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.  The amounts involve many millions 
and even billions of dollars.  The attorneys for the parties call 
expert witnesses who are often leaders in the field of business 
valuation. Thus, the Chancellors who make the business valuation 
decisions have extensive information to use in reaching their 
findings, although they must evaluate the quality of the 
information. 
Section 262(h) provides that the Court of Chancery shall 
consider all relevant factors in determining fair value. The 
statutory language requires that the value determined must be 
fair and does not say “fair market value.” Evidence of market 
value may be offered, but it is a part of “all relevant factors.” 
Relevant factors may include asset value, dividend records, 
earnings prospects, and any additional factors that may relate to 
financial stability or prospect for growth.1 
Historically, the Delaware courts used a weighted average 
business valuation method called the “Delaware Block Method.”  
Its elements were assets, market prices, and earnings multiples. 
That changed after the testimony of the expert witness, Kenneth 
Bodenstein of Duff & Phelps, who presented two other methods.  
They were (1) comparative analysis of premia paid in other 
acquisition transactions and (2) discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis. The Chancellor heard Mr. Bodenstein’s testimony but did 
not accept his methods.  However, upon appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court granted a new hearing and directed that proof of 
value should in the future include any techniques or methods that are 
generally considered acceptable in the financial community and are 
otherwise admissible in court. 
Since the 1983 decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 2 the DCF 
method has been regularly presented as part of the testimony of 
expert witnesses in major appraisal proceedings and often, but not 
always, used as a basis for decisions by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.  Other methods often presented include (1) the deal price 
negotiated by the parties to the merger agreement (2) a comparable 
value analysis based on comparison of companies with privately 
 
 1. Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125; 2005 WL 2045640 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005). 
 2. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A. 2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981); rev.  457 A. 
2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
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owned shares to comparable companies having publicly traded 
shares3, and (3) a comparison of the transaction price proposed by 
the dissenting shareholders to t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  prices of other 
recent comparable merger and acquisition transactions. 
In these methods, the value of any synergies gained by a third-
party acquirer is subtracted. The question of the magnitude of 
synergies may be a vigorously litigated issue in appraisal 
proceedings. We address that matter in Section 3. 
 
II. SOME BASIC REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS 
 
At the outset, Section 262 and its interpretations by the 
Delaware Supreme Court impose some threshold requirements 
and restrictions on the valuation methods that may be used by the 
Court of Chancery to determine fair value. 
First, “fair value” is the value of the petitioners’ shares 
determined on a “going concern” basis. This means that the “fair 
value” is the value of the shares held by the petitioners if the 
consolidation transaction had not occurred and if the acquired 
company had continued to operate its business independently. 
The underlying theory is that a dissenting stockholder is entitled to 
receive the value of what he relinquished in the merger to which he 
objected— i.e., his proportionate share of the corporation as a going 
concern.4  Thus, for example, liquidation value is not an 
acceptable method. 
Second, fair value must exclude any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.  The 
parties to a friendly merger often assert that the exploitation of 
potential synergies is the main (or a main) putative motivation for the 
merger. Sometimes those synergies are real and sometimes they turn 
out to be merely wishful thinking.5 Moreover, the sources of synergy 
 
 3. A recent Court of Chancery decision spoke to the methodology of comparability: 
“A comparable company’s analysis is relevant only when the companies selected are truly 
comparable…. The selected companies need not be a perfect match; however, to be useful 
the methodology must employ a good sample of actual comparable.” In re Appraisal of 
SWS Group, 2017 WL 2334852 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017); aff’d sub nor. Merlin Partners v. 
SWS.  Group, Inc., 2018 Del. LEXIS 77 (Del. Feb. 23, 2018). 
 4. In re Appraisal of The Orchard Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 292 3305; Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 165 (Del.Ch. Jul. 18, 2012) 2012), aff’d, 2013 LEXIS 155 (March 28. 2013). 
 5. For example, Hewlett-Packard announced in September 2001 that they would 
acquire Compaq Computer in an all-stock purchase valued at $25 billion. The acquisition 
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may become issues in antitrust litigation as well as appraisal 
litigation.6 The questions of the existence of synergies and their 
measurements in appraisal proceedings is so significant that Section 
3 undertakes a discussion of the salient issues. 
Third, except for appraisals where controlling shareholders 
have the burden to prove “entire fairness” after a transaction such 
as a “going private” merger, the burden of proof is on both the 
petitioner and the respondent to prove what each claim to be fair 
value.7  If they fail to do so, the Court of Chancery may reject their 
evidence in whole or part in making its determination of fair 
value. The Court of Chancery has the power to appoint its own 
expert witness if it wishes to do so.8 
Fourth, when the discounted cash flow (DCF) method is used, 
no minority discount9 is subtracted or control premium added.10 
The financial/empirical theory of the minority discount is this: no 
matter how liquid and informed the financial markets may be, all 
publicly traded shares persistently and continuously trade in the 
market at a substantial discount relative to their proportionate share 
of the value of the corporation. This discount, it is said, arises because 
the stock prices on national securities markets represent “minority” 
positions, and minority positions trade at a discount to the value of 
the company’s equity. Consider the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
observation in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett11: 
 
 
was at that date the world’s largest information technology merger in history. The 
synergies expected by HP did not materialize. The merged “new” HP lost half of its 
market value and the company incurred heavy job losses. The CEO resigned in 2005. 
 6. Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and David Robinson, The Market for Mergers and the 
Boundaries of the Firm, J. OF FIN., June 2008.  Addressed a related question of who buys 
whom. Contrary to conventional wisdom, they argue that it does not appear that firms 
with relatively high market value tend to buy firms with relatively low market value. 
Instead, they show firms tend to pair with other firms having similar financial ratios. 
 7. In re Appraisal of The Orchard Enterprises, Inc., supra note 4. 
 8. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A. 2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A. 2d 289, 290 (Del. 1996) aff’d in part 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). 
 9. A minority discount reflects the notion that a partial ownership interest may be 
worth less than its pro-rata (proportional) share of the total business. For example, 
ownership of a 10% share in the business may be worth less than 10% of the entire 
company value. 
 10. A control premium is the amount that a buyer is willing to pay over and above 
the current market price in order to acquire a controlling interest in that specific company. 
This premium can be substantial when a target company owns crucial intellectual 
property, real estate, or other assets that an acquirer wishes to own. 
 11. Cavalier Oil Corp. v Hartnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). 
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“Where there is no objective market data available, the 
appraisal process is not intended to restruct [sic.] a pro 
forma sale but to assume that the shareholder was willing to 
maintain his investment position, however slight, had the 
merger not occurred. Discounting individual share 
holdings injects into the appraisal process speculation on the 
various factors which may dictate the marketability of 
minority shareholders. More important, to fail to accord to 
a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his 
shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly 
enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall 
from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting 
shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.”12 
 
Fifth, Section 262(b) of the DGCL excludes appraisal rights 
(with some exceptions) for shares either (i) listed on a national 
securities exchange or (ii) held by record by more than 2,000 
holders. 
As the years have passed, the Court of Chancery has gained 
extensive experience with business valuation methods. That is 
important and necessary because the fair value determinations 
are made by the Court of Chancery. The Chancellor hears and 
evaluates testimony and documents of expert witnesses retained 
by the dissenting stockholder petitioners and the respondent 
corporations and often uses them in reaching its determinations 
of fair value.  However, the Chancellors do so to the extent that they 
accept the testimony and documentary evidence as admissible 
and credible. 
 
III. THE EVALUATION AND JURISPRUDENTIAL 
TREATMENT OF SYNERGIES IN APPRAISAL 
PROCEEDINGS13 
 
As a practical matter, nearly every time one company launches a 
takeover bid for another, the justification is about synergies. The more 
 
 12. In re Appraisal of The Orchard Enterprises, supra at note 4; Cavalier Oil Corp v 
Hartnett supra.. 
 13. A thorough description of the source(s) of synergies can be found in STEPHEN 
ROSS, RANDOLPH WESTERFIELD, JEFFREY JAFFE, AND BRADFORD JORDAN, CORPORATE 
FINANCE 880-886 (McGraw-Hill Education, 12th ed. 2019). 
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and bigger they are the better the deal for both parties to the transaction. 
Microsoft’s announced $26 billion all cash offer for LinkedIn in 2016 is 
an example. In that transaction the CEOs of both companies and the 
media all focused on the synergies in communicating and discussing 
the deal.14 In an appraisal proceeding in which one of the issues is the 
application of the “going concern” theory, a resolution of the analytical 
question of how to measure the putative synergies may be dispositive 
of the case. 
Fair value does not include value which may be claimed for 
“synergies” gained by an acquirer from accomplishment or 
expectation of a merger.  In the context of a merger, the manifestation 
of  synergies (if they are truly significant) means that the interaction 
of the merging business units, when combined, will produce a total 
effect on the earnings of the combination that exceeds the sum of the 
earnings of the individual business units antedating their merger.15 
Thus, to be consistent with the “going concern” theory of valuation, 
and as implicitly mandated by the appraisal statute, going concern 
value does not include, for example, synergies that are expected from 
the merger itself. 
The legal significance of synergies in an appraisal proceeding has 
been addressed by the Delaware Court of Chancery as recently as 
2019. In the case In Re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group,16 
Chancellor Laster summarized the jurisprudential significance 
of synergies in merger appraisal proceedings: 
 
[I]t is widely assumed that the sale price in many 
M&A deals includes a portion of the buyer’s expected 
synergy gains, which is part of the premium the winning 
buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control.”17 
“In an arm’s-length, synergistic transaction, the deal 
price generally will exceed fair value because target 
fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share 
of the anticipated synergies . . ..”18 
 
 14. Todd Zenger, Do M&A Deals Ever Really Create Synergies?, HARV. BUS. REV., July 
6, 2016. 
 15. Economists have long been familiar with the significance of synergies. They can 
be manifested as economies of scale and/or economies of scope. For a technical 
discussion, see Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, and Mike Shor, Managerial 
Economics 86-91 (Cengage Learning, 5th ed. 2018). 
 16. In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline. Grp., Inc., 2019 WL3778370 (Aug. 2019). 
 17. DFC Global Corp. v Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017). 
 18. Olson v ev3, Inc., 2011 WL 704409 1, 10 (Feb. 21, 2011). 
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“[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery 
discern the going concern value of the company irrespective 
of the synergies involved in a merger.”19 
To derive an estimate of fair value, the court must 
exclude “any synergies or other value expected from the 
merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself . . ..”20 
“Of course, estimating synergies and allocating a 
reasonable portion to the seller certainly involves 
imprecision, but no more than other valuation methods, like 
a DCF analysis . . ..” 21 
 
The problematic issues are the difficulty of identifying and 
analytically disentangling economic synergies, if any, exploited by 
the merged firm from the going concern valuation of the firm 
antedating the merger. An explication of the taxonomy and 
manifestation of synergies may be helpful to attorneys litigating the 
issues in an appraisal proceeding.22 
We consider an analytical definition amenable to quantification: 
Synergy occurs if the value of the combined firm after the merger is 
greater than the sum of the value of the value of the acquiring firm 
and the acquired firm while they operated independently before their 
merger.23 
Here is an illustration of the methodology that can be applied to 
measure synergy in a case of publicly traded corporations. Consider 
two independent public corporations: Mongoose Enterprises, Inc., 
and Cobra Corporation. It is reasonable to assume that for public 
corporations, the pre-merger value to their stockholders can be 
determined by observing the market prices of the outstanding 
securities. Suppose the symbol VM represents the pre-merger value of 
Mongoose and the symbol represents VC represents the pre-merger 
value of Cobra. The symbol VM, C represents the market value of the 
combined firm. 
 
 19. MPM Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999). 
 20. Global GT LP v. Golden Teleco, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 21. Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 141 (Del. 
2019). 
 22. A description  of the sources of synergy appears in Corporate Finance. STEPHEN 
ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 880-86 (12TH ED. 2019). 
 23. See DIWAKAR GUPTA & YIGAL GERCHAK, QUANTIFYING OPERATIONAL SYNERGIES 
IN A MERGER/ACQUISITION 517-33 (2002). 
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The difference between the value of the combined firm and the 
sum of the values of the firms operating as independent entities 
measure the aggregate economic value of the synergies, if any, 
flowing from the acquisition.24 
Aggregate dollar value of synergy from the combination    
 
=   VM, C  -  (VM + VC) 
 
This method of measuring the dollar value of the total synergy 
generated by the merger avoids the biases that can (and often do) 
infect the pre-merger subjective expectations and statements of 
management in one or both companies.25 The measurement above 
reflects the consensus of the expectations of the stockholders.  In 
appraisal litigation, stockholder valuations have the advantage of 
being directly measurable and representative of a diversity of 
opinion. 
If one or both companies are not public corporations, the 
measurement of synergistic effects generally requires more 
calculation. Briefly, what is required is a calculation of the net present 
value of three companies. Let the symbol NPVM represent the net 
present discounted value of the pre-merger earnings projected for 
Mongoose; the symbol NPVC represents the net present discounted 
value of the pre-merger earnings projected for Cobra; and the symbol 
NPVM, C represents the net present discounted value of the post-
merger earnings. The synergies generated by the merger can be 
estimated by the formula: 
 
Aggregate dollar value of synergy from the combination  
 
=  NPVM, C  -  (NPVM + NPVC) 
 
The methodology of present value discounting is explained in 




 24. See PATRICK A. GUAGHAN MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 115 (3RD ED. 2002). 
 25. Michael Goold & Andrew Campbell, Desperately Seeking Synergy, HARV. B. REV. 
131, 143 (1998) (explicating the unbounded enthusiasm regarding expected synergies 
displayed by management in companies contemplating a  merger). 
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IV. THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) METHOD 
 
 In a decision in 2018 the Chancery Court expressed this concise 
statement of the DCF method:26 
 
“[A] DCF analysis can provide the court with a helpful 
data point about the price a sale process would have 
produced had there been a robust sale process involving 
willing buyers with thorough information and the time to 
make a bid. 
The basic premise underlying the DCF methodology is 
that the value of a company is equal to the value of its 
projected future cash flows, discounted to the present value 
at the opportunity cost of capital. Calculating a DCF 
involves three steps: (1) one estimates the values of future 
cash flows for a discrete period, where possible, based on 
contemporaneous management projections; (2) the value of 
the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end of 
the discrete period must be estimated to produce a so-called 
terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth model; 
and (3) the value of the cash flows for the discrete period and 
the terminal value must be discounted back using the capital 
asset pricing model or “CAPM.” In simpler terms, the DCF 
method involves three basic components: (1) cash flow 
projections; (2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal value.” 
 
The Court of Chancery has called the DCF method “. . . a well-
established method of determining the going concern value of a 
corporation.”27 In an appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court said during the explanation of its adoption of the deal 
price as the fair value of Dell, Inc.’s shares: 
 
“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing 
companies when there is no credible market information and 
 
 26. Blueblade Capital Opportunities, LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., C.A. No. 11184-VCS 
LEXIS 255 at *76-77 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018). 
 27. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL, LEXIS 81 at *148 (Del. Ch. May 
31, 2016); see generally Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., No. 
565, 2016, Del. LEXIS 518 (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2017). 
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no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs – all 
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly 
credentialed experts – and even slight differences in these 
inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” 
 
The Court of Chancery has found a number of concerns about 
the testimony of some expert witnesses who used the DCF method, 
including experts with prestigious reputations. As a result, the 
Chancellors have sometimes accepted expert testimony only in 
part or with modifications.  They have also sometimes given 
expert testimony no weight if they found it to be unsupported or 
unrealistic. However, cash flows are routinely used in DCF models 
accepted by the Delaware courts. 28 
The Court of Chancery has correctly observed, “Methods of 
valuation, including a discounted cash flow analysis, are only as good as 
the inputs to the model.”29 Because decisions in the Court of Chancery 
are often closely focused on one (or more) critical assumptions of the 
DCF model, we display in this section the anatomy of the model. 
Many of the critical assumptions are numerical constants, called 
“parameters.” 
 
A. CASH FLOW PROJECTIONS 
 
First, the DCF model requires the user (or users) to obtain or 
prepare a forecast of the company’s future cash flow stream on an 
annual basis for each year of a well-defined finite time into the 
future.30 
Chancellor Strine observed: “The most important input necessary 
for performing a proper DCF is a projection of the subject company’s cash 
flows. Without a reliable estimate of cash flows, a DCF analysis is simply a 
guess.”31 
 
 28. See generally Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Civil Action No. 6247-VCP, 
LEXIS 172 at *12-15 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (calculating free cash flows); Blueblade, 2018 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 255, at *36-39. 
 29. See generally Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc., Civil Action No. 
6844-VCG, 2014 WL 545958 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2014), 2013 Del. Ch.  LEXIS 262 (Oct. 31, 
2013) and  Neal v Alabama By-Products Corp., 1990 WL 109243 at 9. 
 30. The Delaware Court of Chancery has long expressed its strong preference for 
management projections. See In re Appraisal of SWS Group, C.A. No. 10554-VCG, 2017 
WL 2334852 at *30 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). 
 31. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 332 (2006). 
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One can find diverse professional opinions as to the appropriate 
definition of the cash flows to be forecasted. Economic experts will 
often differ respecting the definition and method of calculating the 
cash flows to be forecasted. Those definitions include line items 
appearing on almost all financial statement, including: Earnings 
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (symbolized 
by EBITDA) and accounting for capital expenditures. Those capital 
expenditures consist of the money a company spends on maintaining 
and upgrading its capital stock.32 
Because they are significant cash outflows, it is important to 
subtract from EBITDA appropriate amounts of both maintenance and 
discretionary capital expenditures (CAPEX). Maintenance capital 
expenditures are typically for repairs and minor improvements to 
equipment with lives longer than one year and can be subtracted in 
full. 
However, an appropriate amount for discretionary CAPEX can 
be less clear. For example, after a leveraged buyout, CAPEX 
considered by the buyers to be discretionary is often deferred until 
high-risk acquisition debt is reduced. On the other hand, 
discretionary CAPEX should not be deferred longer than necessary, 
or the business might find that those of its competitors who continued 
their discretionary CAPEX have gained competitive advantages. For 
business valuation purposes, one resolution may be to “normalize” 
discretionary CAPEX.  Recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
discussed testimony of two expert witnesses on terminal values and 
explained that in order to support an assumption of a perpetual 
growth rate exceeding inflation in a DCF projection, a firm must 
invest in capital expenditures sustainable at a rate exceeding the rate 
of projected depreciation.33 
For the purpose of this article, we define cash flow as the annual 
earnings the premerger company can be expected to generate before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization minus the capital 
expenditures required if the pre-merger company is to at least 
maintain and upgrade its existing capital in such a way as to remain 
 
 32. Free cash flow represents the cash a company generates after cash outflows to 
support operations and maintain its capital assets. Unlike earnings or net income, free 
cash flow is a measure of profitability that excludes the non-cash expenses typically 
appearing on an income statement and can include spending (if any) on equipment and 
asserts as well as changes in working capital. Kruse v. Synapse Wireless, Inc., 2020 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 238, 2020 WL 3969386, at *29-30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2020). 
 33. In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com. Inc., 2015 WL 399726; 2015 Del.Ch. Lexis 21 
(June 30,2015) 
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reasonably competitive with other firms in its market(s).34 In this 
paper, we represent an annual cash flow to the company by the 
symbol 𝐶𝐹. It is defined as: 
 
𝐶𝐹 = 		𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴	 − 		𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 
 
If the parties can agree on the definition of the annual cash flows, the 
next step requires a decision as to how many years cash flows are to be 
projected.35 
 The economic logic of the appraisal proceedings dictates that the 
projection of the acquired company’s cash flows should begin in the year 
when the company would have continued to conduct its ordinary business 
operations but for the acquisition.  The earnings generated by its ordinary 
business operations, absent the acquisition, would not have manifested any 
synergistic effects of the acquisition.36 
The choice of the projection period (e.g., 5 years, 10 years, etc.) will 
often reflect a congeries of financial, technological, industry and political 
influences. To simplify this exposition, we (arbitrarily) assume the parties 
agree to forecast the cash flows annually each year for 10 years into the 
future. That is, the annual cash flows are projected for each of the years 2021, 
2022, 2023, . . . 2030. 
The projection of the pre-merger cash flow in the year 𝑖 is symbolized 
𝐶𝐹!, where the subscript 𝑖 assumes successive values, 1, 2, 3, 10; each 
subscript designates the future year the annual cash flow is projected. For 
example, 𝐶𝐹"	represents the projected value of the pre-merger annual cash 
flow one year into the future; 𝐶𝐹#	represents the projected annual value of 
the pre-merger cash flow two years into the future, etc. When these 
 
 34. The discretionary  capital expenditures necessary for upgrading a firm’s capital 
assets will vary greatly with respect  to the rapidity of technological innovation in the 
market(s) where it competes. 
 35. If management projections are used as the basis for the DCF calculation, they will 
show the projection period. A recent example of a 5 year projection can be found in in Re 
Appraisal of Panera Bread Company, Court of Chancery, decided January 1, 2020. In Re 
Appraisal of Panera Bread Company, C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ, (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020). 
 36. The corporation “must be valued as a going concern based upon the ‘operative 
reality’ of the company as of the time of the merger,” considering its particular market 
position in light of future prospects. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 
525 (Del. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996)); 
accord Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 
2017). Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 298. Consequently, the trial court must assess “the value of 
the company . . . as a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.” MPM 
Enterprises v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999). Put differently, the valuation date is 
the date on which the merger closes. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. 
Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 525. 
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projections are carried out, the result is a series of annual cash flows 
symbolized by: 
{𝐶𝐹!	, 𝐶𝐹"	, ⋯	𝐶𝐹!#} 
 
The third step in the application of the DFC model requires a selection 
of a numerical value for the discount rate.  Economic experts will often differ 
very sharply respecting the “correct” numerical value of the discount rate to 
apply. This is another issue we finesse by assuming it has been resolved. We 
will return to this issue in Section B below. The numerical value of discount 
rate is symbolized by 𝑟. 




1 + 𝑟 +	
𝐶𝐹"
(1 + 𝑟)" +⋯+	
𝐶𝐹!#




The formula appearing above can be found in any college-level 
textbook on corporate finance or banking. 
The last term in the sum, namely the 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, represents the sum of the 
discounted value of the cash flows accruing to the company for all the years 
after last year in which the annual amounts of the cash low are projected. In 
this example, the values of the annual cash flows are projected for each of 
the years from 1 to 10. Thus, there are 10 individual annual terms in the DCF 
sum. However, the (rebuttable) presumption is that the company will not 
liquidate after year 10. The company is expected to continue its business 
operations in years 11, 12, 13, etc. The discounted 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is  the calculat ion of the discounted 
value of  the sum of the cash f lows in years 11, 12, 13, ad. inf. 
It is obvious that any significant change in one or more of the 
components of the cash flow steam will have a predictable mathematical 
effect on the DCF. 
The following paragraphs discuss how the Court of Chancery a n d  
D e l a w a r e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  h a v e  treated some important inputs 
to DCF analysis. 
The Court of Chancery has recognized in numerous decisions the 
importance to the DCF method of reliable projections of future cash flows. 
The Court of Chancery has repeatedly expressed a preference for 
contemporaneously prepared management projections produced in the 
ordinary course of business.37 The preference does not apply, however, to 
 
 37. Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2004 WL 1152338, at 
*21-22 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004). 
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projections prepared by management with limited experience preparing 
projections and who were at risk of losing their positions if an opposing bid 
succeeded.38 
As Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock said in his opinion on the valuation 
of SWS Group, Inc.: 
 
“Naturally, prior appraisal decisions have recognized 
that it is proper to be skeptical of “post hoc, litigation-
driven forecasts” by experts.  Similarly, the cash flow 
projections have been described by this Court as the “most 
important input” in performing a DCF, and that absent 
reliable projections “a DCF analysis is simply a guess.”39 
Projections of cash flows include achievable (but not speculative) 
cost savings and additional revenues from achievable (but not speculative) 
acquisitions during the projection period.  In an appraisal of a corporation 
which operated facilities offering open MRI radiology services, for 
example, the Court of Chancery held that projected cash flows included 
those of (1) two facilities in successful operation before a merger, (2) two 
facilities established about the time of the merger, and (3) one facility 
not established until over a year after the merger but planned to be part 
of a network of facilities throughout Delaware.40  It should be noted that 
this appraisal followed a “squeeze out” merger arranged by five 
radiologists who owned 62.5% of the corporation’s stock in order to 
eliminate the minority ownership of 37.5% of the stock by three other 
radiologists.  Thus, the five majority stockholders had the burden to prove 
the entire fairness of all aspects of the merger. 
In a proceeding where management projections were not prepared 
in the ordinary course of business and included increases of licensing 
revenues from  television  programs and other intellectual property rights 
which were subject to uncertain future  negotiations, the Court of 
Chancery found that the projected increases were “little more than 
guesswork” and declined to use the DCF method entirely.41 
In a recent decision, the Court of Chancery identified several flaws 
that made cash flow projections unreliable. In brief summary, the Court 
 
 38. Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 2012 WL 1569818, at *17-18 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012)). 
 39. In re Appraisal of SWS Group, C.A. No. 10554-VCG, 2017 WL 2334852 at *31-32 
(Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). 
 40. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 323-24 (Del. Ch. 
2006). 
 41. Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, at *9, 13 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 1, 2013), aff’d, 2015 Del. LEXIS 77, (Del. Feb. 12, 2015); see also Doft at *21-22. 
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found that the projections were prepared by a new management not in 
the ordinary course of business and using a new method which they never 
used before.  Management had a poor track record for accuracy of 
projections. Management also used unreliable assumptions such as a 
projected commencement of important deliveries by a supplier lacking 
technological capability and already lagging behind in its deliveries. 
Management further relied on distortions such as an inventory buildup 
which resulted from customer over ordering after being placed on an 
allocation. Management also relied on financial information, which the 
Court found was distorted by “channel stuffing”, to meet goals for one 
quarter that adversely affected the next quarter.42 
For another quite dramatic example, a chief executive and 
controlling shareholder seeking to take his company private in a “squeeze 
out” merger was found to have committed fraud by arranging to conceal 
from projections made for a DCF valuation being prepared for a board 
committee $30 million of cost savings and profits from farms acquired 
in Central America.43 The concealment made the corporation appear less 
valuable and reduced the merger price. The Court of Chancery held the 
chief executive and controlling stockholder liable for over $148 
million.44 
The important effects of income taxes on cash flow projections are 
treated realistically by the Court of Chancery. Academic textbooks tell 
students that the marginal tax rates should be used to calculate the amounts 
of tax liability. However, the Court of Chancery uses rates and amounts 
realistically expected to be paid during the projection period, including 
a recognition that it is unlikely that a domestic corporation will 
repatriate earnings of its foreign subsidiaries remaining after they have 
paid foreign taxes. For example, in the valuation of Dell, Inc., the Cour t  
of  Chancery  adopted a 21% tax rate, which was held permissible on appeal 
by the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court of Chancery has also held that 
no embedded capital gains tax on a portfolio of securities should be 
subtracted in projecting cash flows in the absence of evidence that the 
securities will be sold.45 
 
 42. LongPath Cap., LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 
4540443, at *50 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). 
 43. A squeeze-out, sometimes synonymous with freezeout, is the compulsory sale of 
the shares of minority shareholders for which they receive a cash compensation. The 
shareholders using this technique are then in a position to dictate the plan of a merger. 
 44. In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, 2015 WL 
5052214, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). 
 45. Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No. 3414-CC, (Del. Ch., May 10, 2010) The 
citation is to a decision letter addressed  counsel by Chancellor Chandler denying a 
reduction in the value of Pubco’s securities  based on a projected capital gains tax liability. 
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The Court of Chancery also determined the effects of a Subchapter S 
election on the value of minority shares of three radiologists that were 
eliminated by a “squeeze out” merger arranged by majority shareholders.  
In order to avoid a windfall to either the petitioners or the respondents, 
the Court focused on the amount of the Subchapter S tax benefit, which 
was taken away from to minority stockholders. The Chancellor calculated 
that each would pocket $60 out of $100 of the income of a Subchapter S 
corporation, but only $51 of $100 of income of a Subchapter C 
corporation. Thus, the Court concluded that income of the Subchapter S 
Corporation should be “tax affected” at a rate of 29.4%.46 
The Court of Chancery has discussed net operating loss (NOL) 
carryforwards and the effect they have to reduce taxes and, thus, to 
increase cash flow projections.47  In that decision, the Court also discussed 
the relation of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and depreciation. 
The Court of Chancery correctly treated stock-based compensation 
(SBC) as noncash expense.48  The Court recognized that SBC causes dilution 
of the stock held by holders of previously outstanding stock, but dilution 
is not cash expense.  Of course, if a corporation pays cash to buy the stock 
used to pay SBC in order to prevent dilution, the cash paid is cash expense.  
Any tax deductions, which may result from the payment of SBC, also 
affect cash projections because they save cash if allowed.  In a more recent 
appraisal, however, the Court of Chancery adopted expert testimony 
adjusting earnings to consider the dilution effect of SBC.49 
 
B. THE DISCOUNT RATE 
 
The Court of Chancery uses, as expected, the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) as the discount rate when app l y i ng  the DCF model.  The 
WACC is a composite cost of various specific sources of funds including, 
common stock, long-term debt, preferred stock (if any) and retained 
earnings. The WACC is the overall rate of return the firm must earn on its 
existing assets to maintain the value of its stock. The objective of any well-
 
The Chancellor also denied a control premium because the value was determined by the 
DCF method. 
 46. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 336 (Del. Ch. 
2006). The same method was subsequently used again in Owen v. Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 165, 2015 WL 3819204, at *23 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015). 
      v. Cannon, 2015 WL 3819204 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015). 
 47. In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, 
at *47-48 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
 48. Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 
3793896, at *44-46 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013). 
 49. In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, 2015 WL 66825 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). 
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managed firm should be to acquire only those assets which are expected to 
provide a higher return than the cost of capital used to finance those 
acquisitions.50 
As a computational matter in the simplest case, the WACC consists of 
t he  s um o f  t he  weighted cost of debt and the weighted cost of 
stockholders’ equity.  The cost of debt is symbolized by 𝑅$.  Its numerical 
value will be a decimal rate-of-return to the corporation’s creditors, usually 
bondholders. The cost of equity, assumed to consisting exclusively of 
common stock, is symbolized by 𝑅%.  Its numerical value will be a decimal 
rate-of-return required by the corporation’s stockholders. 
The weights multiplying each of these costs are the relative proportions 
of the debt and the equity in the firm’s capital structure. This can be 
described mathematically. 
Consider a public corporation with the simplest kind of capital 
structure; it consists of two-line items on the corporation’s financial 
statements: (1) the market value of the company’s long-term debt, 
symbolized by $B plus (2) the market value of stockholders’ equity, 
symbolized by $S.51 
It should be noted that the market values of these two components will 
seldom be equal to their corresponding values appearing on the firm’s 
balance sheet. 
The capital structure of this corporation is defined as V = B + S.52  The 
ratio  &
'
 is the percentage of the firm’s capital structure represented by the 
market value of its long-term debt. Analogously, the ratio  (
'
 is the percentage 
of the firm’s capital structure represented by the market value of its equity. 
It is obvious they must sum to 100%. 
Suppose the average effective tax rate applied to corporate taxable 
income is symbolized by 𝑇). Under current law, the corporate income tax 
rate is 21 %.53 The tax rate is significant because, under the 2017TaxCuts 
and Jobs Act, a company can only deduct interest expense of up to 30% of 
its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Any 
amount of interest expense beyond 30% of EBITDA will no longer be 
 
 50. For a thorough and lucid explanation of the WACC prepared for use by 
practicing professionals  (as opposed to academics) see   
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wacc.asp. 
 51. This definition of the WACC is based on the presumption that the corporation 
has not issued preferred stock. If the corporation has issued preferred stock, the definition 
of the firm’s capital structure can be easily modified to consider that issue. 
 52. STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 397 (10TH ED. 2020). 
 53. The United States imposes a tax on the profits of US resident corporations at 
a rate of 21 percent, reduced from 35 percent. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
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deductible.  The cost of debt to the issuer should consider the fact that it is 
reduced by the amount of the interest deduction allowed by law. 
The WACC in this simple case is calculated as:54 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶	 = 		 A
𝐵
𝑉D𝑅$
(1 −	𝑇%) 	+		 A
𝑆
𝑉D𝑅& 
A simple numerical example illustrates the application of the formula.  
Suppose the company has long-term debt with a market value of $80 million 
and common stock outstanding with a market value of $240 million. Then 
the combined market value of the debt and equity (i.e., the capital structure 
of the firm) is $320 million. 
The cost of debt (symbolized by 𝑅$) is the return that the firm’s 
potential creditors will demand on new borrowing by the firm. Unlike a 
firm’s cost of equity, its cost of debt normally can be observed either directly 
or indirectly because the cost of debt is the interest rate the firm must pay on 
new borrowing.  Suppose it is assumed to be 8%. 
Generally, the cost of equity (symbolized by 𝑅%	)	is defined as the rate 
of return required by the existing stockholders to compensate them for the 
risk(s) they assume by holding the firm’s common stock. (More on this issue 
later in the discussion of the CAPM.) Suppose  𝑅%	 is assumed to be 16%. 
Substituting the assumed numerical values of the parameters into the 





(1 − .21) 	+		I
$240
$80 + $240O16%	 = 	13.58% 
 
In the Appraisal of Dell, Inc., supra, where there was no debt, the 
cost of capital is simply the cos t  o f  equ i t y . 55  To determine cost of 
equity, the Court uses the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Expert witnesses have testified about other methods such as a buildup 
rate model and a risk premium rate model.  Then Chancellor Leo Strine 
explained that concern about the achievability of pa r t s  o f  a company’s 
business plan should be considered by adjustments to the cash flow 
projections and not by adjusting the discount rate.  The buildup model, 
 
 54. The algebraic formula  for the WACC is ubiquitous in finance and accounting 
textbooks. It can also be found on many websites. See Shobit Seth, What is the Formula for 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)?, INVESTOPEDIA (Updated Jan. 17, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/063014/what-formula-calculating-
weighted-average-cost-capital-wacc.asp. 
 55. See also Owen v. Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2015 WL 3819204, at *48 (Del. 
Ch. June 17, 2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 
2069417, at *45-46 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) 
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however, may allow for a variety of risks to be poured into the discount 
rate including so-called projection risk and other factors.56 
In a relatively recent appraisal proceeding, then Chancellor Strine, who 
later become Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, rejected those 
two methods, and added that the buildup method involves a great deal of 
subjectivity.  It is also at odds with the capital asset pricing model ( i . e . ,  
t h e  C A P M ) because it expressly incorporates a company’s specific risk 
rather than only market risk. 
The CAPM has been very thoroughly studied by academics and others 
for decades.  It can be expressed in different ways; in textbooks it is 
commonly written as an algebraic expression: 
 
𝑅% 	=  risk-free rate of return  +  𝛽[Equity risk premium] 
 
In words, the expected return to stock-holders’ equity, symbolized by 
𝑅%, is calculated as the sum of two components: the risk-free rate of return  
+  the product of the numerical value of the  company’s 𝛽 and the Equity risk 
premium. 
Generally speaking, the risk-free rate of return is the rate of return in 
the market on so-called risk-free fixed-income securities. The “risk” in this 
context is credit risk, i.e., the risk that the debt issuer will default. As a 
practical matter, most experts regard the yields on Treasury Bills and Notes 
(of appropriate maturity) as risk-free in the sense explained above. 
Expert witnesses testifying in the Court of Chancery tend to agree, 
or differ only a little, about the risk-free rate.  For example, the experts 
agreed on 3.9% in Appraisal of Orchard Enterprises, Inc.57  The experts 
agreed on 3.31% in Appraisal of Dell, Inc. 58  NOTE: Duff & Phelps, Inc. 
publishes a normalized risk-free rate and equity risk premia. 
Experts often disagree widely on the numerical value of the equity risk 
premium, which is the key to the next component of the CAPM. Most 
academic textbooks on corporate finance and portfolio management define 
the equity risk premium to be the excess return required by holders of equity 
(common stock) over that required by holders of a risk-free asset (such as a 
U.S. Treasury Bill or Note.)59 
From a behavioral point of view, the magnitude of the equity risk 
premium embodies the recognition that investors require an inducement to 
compensate them for taking positions in risky assets instead of a position in 
 
 56. In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, 
at *60-61 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL, LEXIS 81 at *160-61 (Del. Ch. May 
31, 2016). 
 59. RAJNISH MEHAR, HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM (2008). 
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a riskless asset.  It can be construed as the marginal rate of return expected 
by equity investors to induce them to assume the risks of holding common 
stocks instead of a T-Bills.  The definition can be expressed symbolically as: 
 
Equity risk premium  =  Expected return to a well-diversified portfolio 
of common stocks - risk-free rate of return 
 
The relationship between the risk of the rates of return to different kinds 
of securities and the rate of return expected by investors who hold those 
securities is illustrated by the diagram below: 
 
The figure above shows the relationship between the rate of return 
expected by investors on the vertical axis and the riskiness of that return 
displayed on the horizontal axis. Generally, as the riskiness of a portfolio of 
securities increases (represented by a rightward movement along the 
horizontal axis) investors will require an increase in the rate of return they 
can expect (represented by an upward movement along the vertical axis) to 
compensate them for the increased risk they bear. 
The riskiness ineluctably associated with the rate of return on publicly 
traded securities can be defined and measured in different ways. One way to 
think about the risk of return on a portfolio of securities is how dispersed 
those returns are around the average return on that portfolio. That dispersion 
around the average is measured by the standard deviation.60 
 
 60. The mathematical  formula applied to calculate the standard deviation of a 
numerical-valued random variable  (such as the randomly distributed returns  to a 
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Experts disagree both on the method and on the data to be used in the 
determination of the equity risk premium. For years, experts used an 
historical method, but they changed gradually in recent years to a “supply 
side” method and used data from the Ibbotson Yearbook to determine the 
equity risk premium.  In 2012, then Chancellor Strine concluded that the 
academic community had shifted toward greater support for equity risk 
premium estimates that are closer than the supply side rate published by 
Ibbotson and that 5.2% was an appropriate metric to be applied in Appraisal 
of Orchard Enterprises, Inc. A supply side equity risk premium of 6.12% was 
subsequently used in Appraisal of Dell, Inc.61 
A sample of equity risk premia adopted by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery is displayed on the table below. 
 
Sample of the Equity Risk Premia Adopted by the Delaware 















Global GT LP v Golden 
Telecom, Inc. 
April 23, 
2010 Leo Strine 6% 
Gearreald v Just Care, Inc. April 30, 2012 
Donald 
Parsons, Jr. 5.73% 
In re Appraisal of The 
Orchard Enterprises, Inc. 
June 18, 
2012 Leo Strine 5.2% 




2013 Travis Laster 5.5% 





Parsons, Jr.  5.2% 
Laidler  v  Hesco Bastion 
Environmental, Inc. 
May 12, 
2014 Sam Glasscock 6.14% 
In re Rural Metro Corp. 
Stockholders Litigation 
October 
10, 2014 Travis Laster 
both 6.7% 
and 6% were 
considered 
 
portfolio) can be found in  any college level textbook on statistics or financial risk. See 
STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 312-13 (12TH ED. 2019). 
 61. Many textbooks calculate the expected equity risk premium as the difference 
between two rates if return:  (a) the expected rate of the return on diversified portfolio of 
common stocks, or the return to a proxy of such a portfolio (such as the S&P 500 Index) 
and (b) the risk-free rate of return. 
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In re Appraisal of 
Ancestry.com, Inc. 
January 
30, 2015 Sam Glasscock  6.11% 
In re Appraisal  of DFC 
Global Corp 
July 8, 
2016 C. Bouchard 6.18% 
John Dunmire v Farmers & 
Merchants Bankcorp 
Nov. 10, 
2016 C. Bouchard 6.18% 
In re Appraisal of SWS 
Group, Inc.  
May 30, 
2017 Sam Glasscock 6.21% 
Blueblade Capital 






In re Appraisal of 
Consolidated Jarden 
Corporation 
Sept.  16, 
2019 
Joseph R. 
Slights  5.03% 
Manichean Capital, LLC  v  






This sample of decisions demonstrates that in the last ten years the 
equity risk premia found by chancellors in diverse cases has ranged 
between 5.03% and 6.7%.  This fact should suggest to practitioners that 
any equity risk premium grossly exceeding these boundaries is likely to be 
viewed with skepticism by the Court of Chancery. 
The third component of the CAPM is the numerical value imputed to 
the symbol 𝛽. Virtually every publicly traded stock is associated with its 
own unique numerical value of  𝛽. Many investment banks and financial 
research companies compile and publish estimates of the values of 𝛽 for 
listed stocks.62 
Examination of the algebraic expression of the CAPM shows that the 
numerical value of 𝛽 acts as a volatility multiplier for the expected return to 
stock-holders’ equity for specific stocks.  This means that the expected return 
to stock-holders’ equity for a specific stock is magnified (or diminished) 
because the numerical value of the  𝛽 associated with that stock multiplies 
the equity risk premium. 
Suppose, for example, the value of  𝛽 for a specific stock is larger than 
1. In that example, if the equity risk premium should increase by an arbitrary 
amount, the expected return to stock-holders’ equity in that specific stock 
will increase by a larger amount. The effect is symmetric; if the equity risk 
 
 62. The financial meaning of β for a specific stock is that it measures the systematic 
relationship (if any) between the variability of the rate of return on that stock and 
variability of the general public market for stocks.  Estimates of  β for listed companies are 
available to any person with internet connectivity. For example, Yahoo finance publishes 
its estimates of the β for every corporation listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and the OTC. 
See https://finance.yahoo.com. 
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premium should decrease by an arbitrary amount, the expected return to 
stock-holders’ equity in that specific stock will decrease by a larger amount. 
Expert witnesses often differ significantly in their derivation of the 
𝛽 volatility multiplier component of the CAPM. When a privately- 
owned corporation is being valued, the experts look to comparable 
companies with publicly traded stock to come up with a proxy for the 
private corporation’s	𝛽.  In an appraisal of a privately owned corporation 
in 2006, Chancellor Strine discussed comparable companies,  which he 
called the “Core Four”, which were the most comparable, and two 
somewhat less comparable companies, which, when added, he called the 
“Big Six”. The Chancellor used the available evidence to derive four values 
of 𝛽 and then calculated their mean to arrive at a 𝛽 of 1.20.63 
In 2017 decision, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock modified the 
application of the CAPM by adding a “size premium” to the equation.64  
The Vice Chancellor calculated the expected value of 𝑅%  as: 
 
𝑅&	=  risk-free rate of return  + 𝛽[Equity risk premium] + Size premium 
 
The basic rationale of applying a “size premium” is an 
acknowledgement that, on average, smaller companies achieve higher risk-
adjusted returns.  In the long run, higher returns are related with higher risk. 
The additional return of smaller companies is thought to be not fully reflected 
in the CAPM (i.e., the numerical value of  𝛽 is underestimated.) To reflect 
the putative additional risk of smaller companies adequately, the cost of 
equity derived from the CAPM is “adjusted” with a size premium and 
perhaps a unique risk premium.  In theory, the smaller a company’s market 
capitalization, the higher the size premium. This theory of size premium 
adjustment is not free from controversy. 65 However, a valuation professional 
who thinks that a small size premium does not fully reflect the financial risk 
of a particular company may add a specific company or unique risk premium. 
That practice has found a skeptical reaction in the courts: “To judges, the 
company specific risk premium often seems like the device experts employ to 
 
 63. Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, 
at *61 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005). 
 64. In re Appraisal of SWS Group, C.A. No. 10554-VCG, 2017 WL 2334852 at *17-18 
(Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). 
 65. The scholarly literature on whether and how to apply a size premium is less than 
enlightening. The same respected scholars have found different results depending on the 
data set, and others have engaged in vigorous debate about how to interpret the data and 
what inferences to draw. In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Company, C.A. No. 2017-
0385-JTL, at *136 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019). 
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bring their final results into line with their clients’ objectives, when other 
valuation inputs fail to do the trick.”66 
 
Discounted Residual (Terminal) Value. 
The next, and usually the most significant step monetarily, is to evaluate 
the discounted residual value (also called “terminal value”) which is 
typically calculated using the perpetual growth model. A critically important 
foundation to validate the application of the model is the assumption that 
future cash flows, after the last of them forecasted, has the mathematical 
property of a constant growth perpetuity. This is frequently referred to by the 
Delaware courts (and others) as the “Gordon growth model.”67 This is a standard 
and accepted method of measuring terminal value; it assumes that the 
company’s free cash flows will grow at a constant rate in perpetuity.68  The 





𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	 − 		𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  
 
The formula assumes that the financial performance of the company 
being valued has reached a stable state where it is no longer experiencing the 
rapid growth achieved by some startup corporations. The premise of the 
formula is that the company will continue to grow at a reasonable stable 
average annual rate, referred to in the formula as the  
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	That rate is often assumed to be equal to the long-term 
average annual rate of growth experienced by mature firms in its industry, 
including whatever portion of that growth is attributable to inflation. 
Most of the value calculated by the DCF methods usually comes from 
the residual value because the formula estimates value in perpetuity. The 
diagram displayed below illustrates the sensitivity of the undiscounted 
residual value to different hypothetical growth rates. 
 
 66. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 339 (Del. Ch. 
2006). 
 67. See Kendall Hoyd and Silver Spur Capital Partners, LP  v. Trussway Holdings, 
C.A. No. 2017-0260-SG, at *18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2019); see also PAUL ASQUITH & LAWRENCE 
A. WEISS, LESSONS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 348 (2016). 
 68. Willian Richard Kruse, individually and as Trustee for the Vivian Calvert Kruse 
Living Trust and the William Richard Kruse Living Trust, C.A. No. 12392-VCS, at *52 (Del. 
Ch. Jul. 14, 2020). 
 
2021 BUSINESS VALUATION METHODS  359 
 
 
The diagram displayed above illustrates how seemingly small changes 
in the growth rate assumption (e.g., from 2% to 4%) applied to project the 
undiscounted residual values can have large numerical consequences for 
valuation of the Discounted Terminal Value. 
A recent example of how the Chancellor derived a terminal growth rate 
appears in a 2017 decision. The Court of Chancery wrote: 
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Illustration of the undiscounted residual 
values of a cash flow at different growth 
rates, for each of 30 years after the 
annual projection terminates
hypothetical growth rate = 6%
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“[The peti t ioner’s expert] employed a 3% 
terminal growth rate after performing his 
recommended adjustments to management 
projections.  [The respondent’s expert] set  his 
terminal growth rate sl ightly higher,  at  3.5% 
which he derived from the midpoint of  the long-
term expected inflation rate of  2.3% and the long 
term expected economic growth rate of  the 
economy at large of 4.4%” 
 
In one appraisal, the Chancellor found that he had made a mathematical 
error in his DCF calculations and decided to counterbalance the error by 
increasing the growth rate in his calculation of residual value.  On appeal, 
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of this mistaken 
adjustment and reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery for that and 
other reasons. 
The Final Piece of a DCF Appraisal.  When all is said and done, and 
the DCF model has been applied with all its refinements; a dollar amount 
is the result of the DCF calculations. The final step in the appraisal 
protocol is the determination of the appraisal price per share. That is the 
price the Court will determine to be the fair value of the shares of 
dissenting stockholders. This step is mainly a matter of arithmetic. If the 
DCF is calculated, and the number of shares outstanding in the hands of 
public investors antedating the merger is symbolized by 𝑆, the appraisal 
share price is calculated as  +,-
(
. 
For example, suppose the Court of Chancery finds the DCF to be $12.8 
billion. Suppose the number of shares outstanding in the hands of the public 
is 400 million common. Then the calculation of the appraisal price is $32.00 
per share. 
V. MARKET VALUE ANALYSIS 
 
The Unaffected Market Price. When a corporation to be acquired by merger has 
shares traded on a stock exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the 
NASDAQ, or has shares traded in an Over-the-Counter Market, the trading price in 
the market are among the “relevant factors” to be considered.  This assumes that the 
shares are not excluded from appraisal under DGCL Section 262 as described earlier. 
The trading price on the day when a merger is announced to the public is, of 
course, affected by the price disclosed in the announcement.  Further, history has 
shown that the trading price tends to rise for some time before a merger 
announcement as speculators purchase in anticipation of an announcement.  Thus, 
the Court of Chancery may look to average trading prices for a prior period such as 
30 or 60 days to obtain a market price unaffected by anticipation of the merger 
announcement. 
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In evaluating trading prices, the Court of Chancery considers whether there is 
an “efficient market” for the shares, meaning a market which provides information 
promptly and accurately to shareholders and provides modern facilities and services 
to buy or sell if they want to do so.  For example, the Delaware Supreme Court found 
that the shares of Dell, Inc. had a deep public float; were covered by over 30 analysts; 
had 145 market makers; and over 5% of its shares changed hands each week.  The 
Court called such characteristics hallmarks of an efficient market and added that 
Dell’s stock price had a track record of reacting to developments concerning the 
company.69 
In 2019, the Chancery Court found that the $48.13 unaffected market price of 
shares of Jarden Corporation was their fair price.  The Chancellor pointed to flaws in 
the other methods presented by the parties, including the deal price of $59.21 per 
share and the parties’ DCF valuation which he described as “fantastically divergent”.  
He found that Jarden’s shares were traded in a semi-strong efficient market.70  He 
said the stock was traded at the New York Stock Exchange and included in the S&P 
400 Index.  Its daily and weekly trading volume were in the top 25% of the S&P 500.  
Its market capitalization uses in the top 20% of all publicly traded firm and the public 
float was 94%.  The bid-asked spread was only .02% and approximately 20 
professional market analysts covered and disseminated reports on Jarden.71 
 
Comparable Companies And Comparable Transactions. In 2017, Chief Justice 
Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court wrote a history of business 
valuation methods that were used in appraisals by the Delaware courts 
including comparable companies’ analysis and comparable transactions 
analysis.72  However, comparables analysis had been used less frequently 
than the DCF method in business appraisal litigation since the Weinberger 
decision.  In his opinion, the Chief Justice went further to say:” 
 
 69. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 25 (Del. 
2017). 
 70. The definition of a so-called “semi-strong efficient market” can be found in most 
college level textbooks on  corporate finance or portfolio management. A typical statement 
is that the stock market is efficient with respect to all publicly available information. The 
concept of “efficiency”  in this context means that any new and relevant fact, or any new 
development,  known to the public (or which will be known to the public without 
significant delay)  is reflected immediately  in a company’s stock price. The logical 
implication of that proposition is that it is impossible for a portfolio manager to 
consistently outperform broad-based measures of general market performance (e.g., the 
S&P 500 Index.) See generally STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE (12TH ED. 2019). 
The proposition is disputed by academics as well as financial professionals outside the 
academy. 
 71. In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, 2019 WL 3244085, at *59 (Del. Ch. July 19, 
2019). 
 72. See generally DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P’rs, 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
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“Market prices are typically viewed superior to other 
valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person’s 
discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill 
the collective judgment of many based on all the publicly 
available information about a given company and the value 
of its shares. Thus, a singular discounted cash flow model is 
often most helpful when there is not an observable market 
price.” 
 
Briefly, the first step in comparable company analysis is research to identify, if 
possible, a peer group of companies with publicly traded shares that have comparable 
operational and equity characteristics to the company being valued.  The next step to 
calculate key metrics for the companies in the peer group such as market 
capitalization and enterprise value.  The analyst then calculates multiples for the 
companies in the peer group such as earnings per share, EBITDA per share, and book 
value per share if the companies are financial companies.  The multiples can be 
historic or preferably future oriented.  The numbers of shares should be fully diluted 
for exercise of stock options and conversion of debentures and preferred stock.  These 
multiples are then compared to those of the company being valued.  The comparative 
results can be divided into percentiles such as 25%, 50% (median), and 75%. 
Information available to identify peer group comparable companies, as well as 
comparable merger and acquisition transactions, can be found in reports to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission; articles and data in the Wall Street Journal and 
the Financial Times; articles and data published by accounting firms, investment 
banking firms and law firms; and on-line publications such as Fact Set, Bloomberg 
(Supply Chain), S&P Capital IQ, and Pitch Book. 
The burden of proof of comparability rests on the party seeking to use a 
comparable method.  The Court of Chancery has said: “The selected companies 
need not be a perfect match; however, to be useful the methodology must 
employ “a good sample of actual comparables.” 
The Court of Chancery went on to find in Orchard Enterprises that the 
companies selected by an expert witness were not truly comparable.73 
When the appraisal of DFC Global was decided on appeal in 2017, the 
Delaware Supreme Court said as follows: 
 
“Although the petitioners’ expert argued that none of 
the comparable companies had a mix of business and 
geographic locations that were sufficiently similar to DFC, 
there was ample evidence in the record to support the 
Chancellor’s decision that the six comparable companies 
 
 73. In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, 
at *83 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
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both experts used were, in fact, sufficiently comparable for 
this analysis.” 
 
The Supreme Court went on to indicate that a “market check” could 
have been used to evaluate the reliability of DCF analysis but concluded that 
the deal price was the most reliable indication of fair value of DFC Global’s 
shares.  Thus, comparable companies’ analysis was not used as the method 
which actually determined fair value.74 
Chancellor Joseph Slights recently devoted ten pages to discussion of 
comparable companies’ methodology in his appraisal of Jarden Corporation.  
However, he finally agreed with the testimony of the respondent’s expert 
that Jarden had no comparable peers.  He gave the testimony on comparable 
companies no weight and concluded that the fair value was the unaffected 
market price of Jarden’s shares.75  Thus, the comparable companies’ method 
continues to be seldom successfully used to determine a fair price in strongly 
contested appraisal cases. 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Chancery 
Court, after finding, among other things, that the DCF valuations by experts 
were wildly divergent.76 The Supreme Court held the unaffected market price 
was satisfactory.77 
VI. THE “DEAL PRICE” 
 
In several appraisals in recent years, the Court of Chancery declined 
prices determined by the DCF method and other valuation methods and 
found that the “deal price” in the merger agreement was the fair price.  Flaws 
in the application of other business valuation methods contributed to those 
decisions.  However, the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court adopted 
the “deal price” when they found that the deal had been negotiated and 
determined by procedures which demonstrated that it was “fair value” to the 
dissenting shareholders.  To describe those procedures, it is necessary to 
review some history briefly. 
The courts in Delaware have traditionally applied a standard called the 
“business judgment rule” to evaluate management proposal or conduct 
challenged it lawsuits by shareholders.  However, when the management 
conduct involves a conflict of interest, the Delaware courts have applied a 
stricter standard called the “entire fairness” rule.  Under the business 
judgment rule, the shareholders have the burden of proof.  Under the entire 
 
 74. DFC, 172 A.3d at 369. 
 75. In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, 2019 WL 3244085, at *29. 
 76. Fir Tree Value Master Fund v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313, 315 (Del. 2020). 
 77. Id. 
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fairness standard, management has the burden of proof of the fairness of 
every aspect of a challenged transaction. An example of a merger involving 
a conflict of interest is a “force out” merger of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders.78 
The Delaware Supreme Court held decades ago that management of a 
corporation being sold has auction like duties to obtain the best price for its 
shareholders.79  In response, managements developed several steps that they 
could take to show that they were fulfilling the auction duties.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court subsequently clarified that there is really one obligation 
which is to take reasonable steps to get the best price for the shareholders.  
The Delaware Supreme Court declined to order specific steps or to identify 
how to achieve the goal, but left managements free to plan and negotiate in 
good faith how to fulfill their “Revlon duties.”80 A list of some of the steps 
which may be taken is as follows: 
1. Appointment of a committee of independent directors with its own 
legal counsel, financial advisers, and authority to negotiate the merger price 
and other terms. 
2. Obtaining a “fairness” opinion from an independent and expert 
business valuation firm such as Evercore, Inc. or Duff & Phelps Corporation. 
3. Conducting an initial “market check” to identify and commence 
discussions with potential buyers including, if available, strategic and 
financial bidders. 
4. Cooperating with “due diligence” reviews by potential bidders and 
making key personnel and documents available pursuant to reasonable 
confidentiality agreements. 
5. Negotiating with bidders for higher prices. 
6. Negotiating contract terms that enable fulfillment of their fiduciary 
obligators including “go shop” provisions and no more than a reasonable 
“breakup fee.” 
7. Performing the “go shop” campaign effectively. 
8. Arranging with a controlling shareholder or shareholders, if any, to 
cooperate reasonably with the auction process and to refrain from seeking to 
negotiate conflicting terms with potential bidders. 
9. Fulfillment of disclosure obligations to enable the securities market 
to operate efficiently. 
In recent years, the number of companies that have well performed the 
auction duties appears to have grown and improved the prices paid to 
 
 78. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del. Ch., 426 A.2d 1333, 1345 (1981), rev’d on other 
grounds, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 701 (1983); see also generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858 (Del. 1985) (applying enhanced scrutiny though a conflict of interest was not 
involved). 
 79. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (1986). 
 80. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241 (Del. 2009). 
 
2021 BUSINESS VALUATION METHODS  365 
shareholders in merger transactions.  On the other hand, the Delaware Court 
of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court have been increasingly critical 
of the testimony presented by some experts in support of DCF valuations, 
especially of extremely optimistic or erroneous projections of cash flows by 
experts.  The result has been several appraisal decisions which rejected DCF 
valuations and concluded that the deal price was the fair price. 
In August 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision of the 
Chancery Court involving an appraisal of the shares of DFC Global 
Corporation, an international payday loan firm, which had determined not to 
give more than one-third weight to the deal price.  The Court of Chancery 
had given weight to comparable company analysis which the Supreme Court 
found was within the Chancellor’s discretion.  The Supreme Court found the 
DCF valuation adopted by the Chancellor was erroneous in its determination 
of perpetuity growth rate and in other ways.  The Supreme Court ordered the 
Chancellor to reassess the weights and said that the relevant factors 
suggested that the deal price was the most reliable indication of fair value.81 
In December 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court again reversed a 
decision by the Court of Chancery which had appraised the shares of Dell, 
Inc. at a fair value of $17.62 per share.  The Supreme Court commented early 
in its opinion that the $17.62 amount was far more than the deal price of 
$13.75 per share which was already a 37% premium to the ninety-day 
average unaffected stock price.  The Chancellor and the Supreme Court 
agreed that the petitioners’ DCF analysis lacked credibility on its face.  The 
Supreme Court held that the Chancellor had then relied exclusively on his 
own DCF analysis which was based on several erroneous assumptions and 
arrived at a value nearly $7 billion above the transaction price.  The Supreme 
Court described the procedures used to negotiate the sale of Dell, Inc. 
including cooperation with extensive due diligence reviews by potential 
buyers (which were primarily private equity firms) as well as negotiation of 
bid price increases, “Go Shop” activities, and agreements by Michael Dell 
to cooperate with any of the potential bidders.  In ordering that the 
Chancellor reconsider, the Delaware Supreme Court described several 
factors which it said suggested strong reliance on the deal price and far less 
weight, if any, on the DCF analysis.82 
In 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed another appraisal 
decision by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of shares of Aruba 
Networks, Inc., a company engaged in wired, wireless and security 
networking solutions. The Court of Chancery had decided that the fair value 
of Aruba’s shares was their 30-day average unaffected market price of 
 
 81. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 351 (Del. 2017). 
 82. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 46-47 
(Del. 2017). 
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$17.13 per share traded on the New York Stock Exchange.  However, in 
April 2019 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the fair value was $19.10 
which reflected the deal price minus a portion of synergies left with sellers.  
The Supreme Court said that the $19.10 deal price was corroborated by the 
buyer, Hewlett Packard, and Aruba and by Aruba’s DCF, comparable 
companies, and comparable transactions analysis.83 
The Supreme Court decision in the Aruba case appears to us to be more 
than an ordinary reversal. It was critical of the Chancellor on several issues 
and found that there was lack of support in the record for his findings. The 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of deciding on the fair value of $19.10 
instead of its usual practice of remanding the case back to the Chancellor. 
In its en Banc opinion, the Supreme Court expatiated on the economic 
theory of how “agency costs” can factor into the determination of fair value.  
The Court wrote: 
 
“Applying the going-concern standard, we hold that 
the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in using 
Aruba’s ‘unaffected market price’ because it did so on the 
inapt theory that it needed to make an additional deduction 
from the deal price for unspecified ‘agency costs’. . . Indeed, 
neither party presented any evidence to suggest that any 
part of the deal price paid by HP, a strategic buyer, involved 
the potential for agency cost reductions that were not 
already captured by its synergies estimate. Synergies do not 
just involve the benefits when, for example, two symbiotic 
product lines84 can be sold together.  They also classically 
involve cost reductions that arise because, for example, a 
strategic buyer can produce the same or greater profits with 
fewer employees. . . Private equity firms often expect to 
improve performance and squeeze costs too, including by 
reducing ‘agency costs.’ “85 
 
In 2018, the Court of Chancery determined that the fair price of the 
shares of Solera Holdings, Inc. (an international leader in data and software 
for automotive, homeowners and identity management) was the deal price 
less estimated synergies, i.e., $53.53 per share.  In reaching that conclusion, 
 
 83. Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 131 (Del. 
2019). 
 84. “Symbiotic” product lines are defined by economists as complementary goods 
and/or services. 
 85. In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 256, 2018 WL 
3625644, at *39 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018); see also ROBERT W. HOLTHAUSEN & MARK E. 
ZMIJEWSKI, CORPORATE VALUATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 681 (2ND ED. 2014). 
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the Court of Chancery rejected petitioners’ claim based on a “fairly 
unbelievable” DCF analysis that the fair value was $84.65 per share.  The 
Court of Chancery also rejected a belated claim by the petitioners that the 
fair value was the unaffected market price of $36.39 per share.  In support of 
its valuation, the Court of Chancery described in detail the sale process 
conducted, among other things, by a special committee of independent 
directors and included a 28 day “Go Shop” project.  The Chancellor also 
explained that Solera’s shares were traded at the New York Stock Exchange 
in an “efficient market.”86 
Repeated rejections in appraisal proceedings of expert testimony based 
on the DCF method using unrealistic cash flow projections and other 
overoptimistic assumptions have increased the risk of appraisal arbitrage. 
In a related lawsuit, Solera Holdings, Inc. obtained a decision from the 
Delaware Superior Court that it is entitled to recover its defense costs and 
prejudgment interest from its directors and officers (D&O) liability insurer.87 
The Superior Court held that Solera’s expenses were a “violation” and, thus, 
a “Securities Claim” within the language of the insurer’s D&O policy.88 
Decisions by the Delaware Superior Court may be appealed to the Delaware 
Supreme Court. 
During 2020, The Chancery Court again, adopted the deal price as fair 
value in Appraisal of Panera Bread Co.89  After negotiating price increases, 
the deal price reached $315 per share.  Finding that “Go shop” efforts were 
unlikely to produce a higher price.  The Chancery Court found that deal price 
minus synergies totaling $11.56 were a fair value of $303.44 per share.  In 
fact, no competitive bidder appeared after the deal was signed.90 
The dissenting shareholders contended that synergies should not have 
been subtracted and Panera’s parent, SAB Holdings, claimed it was entitled 
to a refund of its amount paid for those synergies.  However, the Chancery 
Court denied both claims.91 
VII. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE 
 
Before closing this article, a few comments should be made on the 
subject of “appraisal arbitrage.”  To put it simply, appraisal arbitrage 
 
 86. In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 256, 2018 WL 
3625644, at *61-62 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018). 
 87. Solera Holdings, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 213 A.3d 1249, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2019). 
 88. Id. 
 89. In Re Appraisal of Panera Bread Company, C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ, (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 31, 2020). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 
 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 17:2 368 
signifies a situation where venture firms buy target-company shares shortly 
after a deal’s announcement.  They execute those trades principally (if not 
solely) to seek a judicial appraisal resulting in a judicially ordered increase 
of the share price paid to those venture capitalists as well as other dissenting 
shareholders.  A 2007 opinion in In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Inc. 
opened the door for appraisal arbitrage, and the data show that this strategy 
has become more prevalent over time.92 
Those “dissenting” investors finance the extensive costs of the appraisal 
proceedings through venture capital funds, which take the necessary 
procedural steps to bring appraisal proceedings.  These petitioners seek in 
the appraisal proceedings to recover a fair value of their shares, plus interest 
and costs that is higher than the price they paid for the shares.93  As 
mentioned above, there is no requirement that they owned their shares before 
the merger was announced. 
The post-announcement purchasers petitioning for an appraisal assume 
a binary risk that can be described this way: 
The risk that the appraisal proceedings will result in a significantly 
higher fair value than the deal price. 
The complementary risk is that the proceedings will result in a fair value 
lower than the deal price. 
In a risk (a), the appraisal arbitrageurs will earn a positive return only 
if the premium found by the court (if any) exceeds their litigation-related 
costs of the appraisal.  In risk (b) the arbitrageurs may sustain a significant 
loss if fair value is found to be less than the sum of their purchase price and 
their litigation costs.  Note that these are the same risks assumed by any 
dissenting shareholder.94  The risk described is eased to some extent by 
rewards of interest compounded quarterly at a rate 5% above the Federal 
Reserve’s discount rate. 
There is an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which increased 
appraisal litigation in the Delaware Chancery Court is beneficial from a 
public policy perspective. 
Appraisal arbitrage cases can be lengthy. In a 2020 publication 
Professor Jiang and his co-authors found that while the time from the 
effective date of a merger to the filing of the first appraisal petition averages 
73 days, the time to resolution is much longer. For example, the average time 
 
 92. DAVID MARCUS & FRANK SCHNEIDER, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,  APPRAISAL 
LITIGATION IN DELAWARE: TRENDS IN PETITIONS AND OPINIONS 2006-2018 (2019). 
 93. In response to the growing practice of appraisal arbitrage, in 2016 Delaware’s 
General Assembly amended the state’s appraisal statute, Section 262 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.  The amendment to Section  262(h) granted corporations the 
option to “prepay” appraisal claimants an amount of the corporation’s choosing in order 
to stop the accrual of interest. See 8 Del. C. § 262. 
 94. Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650, 652 (Del. Ch. 
1989); appeal refused, 571 A.2d 787, 1990 WL 18152 (Del. 1990). 
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to reach settlement after the first petition is filed is 406 days and if there is a 
court decision the time from filing to that decision is on average 2.6 years.95 
Importantly, during these long intervals pre-judgment interest, set at five 
percentage points above the risk-free rate, constitutes a significant part of the 
returns to appraisal arbitrageurs. 
There are some gross statistical findings that help to assess the 
magnitude of the binary risk of appraisal arbitrage.  Between year 2006 and 
year 2018, there was an almost even split between the rulings in which fair 
value was determined to be above the deal price and rulings in which fair96 
value was determined to be at or below the deal price.  Moreover, there is a 
substantial variation in the premia awarded.  Of the 34 cases decided by the 
Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court between 2008 and 2018, 
the average premium was 18 percent above the deal price.  For the 16 cases 
in which a positive premium was awarded, the average premium was 47 
percent. 
Unlike many small shareholders, venture capital funds have generally 
had experience and resources to hire skilled legal counsel and to interview 
qualified and prestigious expert business valuation wit nesses who are 
optimistic about the business of the corporation acquired in a merger.  For 
some decades after the decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., appraisal 
arbitrage was often successful, especially when respondent corporate parties 
to a merger did not seek (or put to use) expert business valuation advice or 
failed to fulfill Revlon duties.  As time has passed, however, corporate 
merger parties have become more willing, when possible, to obtain early and 
put to use expert legal and business valuation advice during planning and 
then in appraisal proceedings.  In court, expert testimony has been 
challenged when perceived to be overoptimistic or incorrect.  As the reader 
has seen, there have been a number of appraisal proceedings where fair value 
was found to be the deal price or even lower than the deal price. 
In 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the DFC Global and Dell 
cases, sending a clear message that in the future the lower court should rely 
more heavily on the deal price, especially in arms-length deals, in assessing 
valuation. This philosophy was reinforced by a 2019 Delaware Supreme 
Court opinion in Aruba Networks.  The research by Jiang, et. al cited above 
found that those cases led to lower returns from appraisal arbitrage, mostly 
by significantly reducing valuation improvement from appraisals. These 
results increase the risk of appraisal arbitrage, but also appear to benefit 
 
 95. Jiang, Wei and Li, Tao and Thomas, Randall S., The Long Rise and Quick Fall of 
Appraisal Arbitrage (February 28, 2020). Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 20-16, 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546281 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546281. 
 96. MARCUS, supra note 92. 
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shareholders as a whole by providing higher deal prices.97 A paper published 
in 2019 contributes to this discussion.98 The authors of that paper find, among 
other things, that compared to deals without appraisal challenges, deals 
subject to appraisal challenges have, on average, a 6% lower post-
announcement arbitrage spread. Based on this observed gap, the authors 
claim that appraisal challenges benefit target shareholders by narrowing 
arbitrage spreads. In particular, they state that: 
 
“[t]he narrower spread provides preexisting investors in such firms the 
option to receive approximately 6 percent more value if they decide to sell 
prior to closing (insuring against the risk of deal failure). Passive investors 







 97. Several commentators have decried appraisal arbitrage as imposing avoidable 
risks and costs on  deal certainty and pricing.  Those commentators argue that appraisal 
arbitrage reduces/destroys target shareholder value.  A research paper, dated December 
2017, (applying what one might call “high tech” mathematics and econometrics) found 
that the appraisal-liberalizing events of 2007 were associated with a significant increase in 
deal premia, as the enhanced credibility of appraisal implicitly raised the de facto “reserve 
price” associated M7A auctions.  The authors of the paper found little evidence to suggest 
that liberalized appraisal stifled the availability of appraisal eligible deals.  All told, the 
nature and context these shocks suggest that target-company shareholders likely 
benefitted ex ante from liberalized judicial policies related to appraisal.  Callahan, Scott, 
Darius Palia and Eric Talley. 2018. Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value. Journal of 
Law, Finance, and Accounting 3(1): 147-188. 
 98. Boone, Audra, Brian Broughman and Antonio J. Macias. 2019. Merger Negotiations 
in  the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal. 62(2) THE J. OF L. & ECON., 281 (2019). 
